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Abstract 
The consequences of the post-electoral impasse in 
which Moldova finds itself after the parliamentary 
elections on 5 April 2009 are immense for the EU’s 
relations with Moldova and for the success of its 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Eastern 
Partnership (EaP). Despite many problems, 
Moldova is considered one of the ‘frontrunners’ as 
regards ENP implementation and is poised to 
negotiate an Association Agreement and a deep and 
comprehensive free trade agreement in the coming 
months. Yet the violent protests that rocked the 
Moldovan capital, Chisinau, on 7 April 2009, and 
the authorities’ subsequent violent arrests and 
beatings of protesters, journalists and opposition 
figures, may have negative repercussions on 
Moldova’s European integration efforts. The 
reversal in Moldova’s transition to a Western-style 
democracy may accelerate, failing a resolute 
response by the EU. This policy brief argues that 
first, the EU should put pressure on Moldova to stop 
its crackdown and investigate human rights 
violations, and second, the EU should make an 
attractive offer of increased cooperation and 
assistance if Moldovan authorities seek an 
agreement with the opposition and show progress in 
implementing democratic reforms. Failing this, the 
EU may witness yet another undoing of democratic 
reforms by one of its Eastern neighbours.  
Three scenarios for Moldova 
In Moldova’s April parliamentary elections, the 
ruling Communist Party won 60 out of the 101 seats 
(61 votes are needed to elect the president). 
Following the call of opposition parties and civil 
society activists, notably through the Internet (the 
protests have also been dubbed Moldova’s ‘twitter 
revolution’), which accused the Communists of 
electoral fraud, around 15,000 persons turned up to 
protest in Chisinau’s main square. The protests soon 
turned violent with the demonstrators setting the 
evacuated presidency and parliament buildings on 
fire. Emerging evidence would suggest that among 
the demonstrators there were provocateurs who had 
infiltrated the protest and who instigated the crowd 
to violence. In subsequent days, the government 
cracked down on peaceful protestors, bystanders, 
journalists and some opposition figures. There are 
already three confirmed deaths, probably following 
torture and ill treatment at the hands of the 
Moldovan police, and several hundreds have been 
arrested.
1 Many local and foreign journalists have 
been intimidated or forced to leave Moldova.  
The significance of this for Moldova should not be 
underestimated. Moldova has been credited since its 
independence in 1991 for being among the select 
few post-Soviet states where elections have been 
relatively free and fair. Notwithstanding the 
administrative abuses, intimidation of the opposition 
and their restricted access to the media during the 
2009 electoral campaign, in its preliminary election-
monitoring report the OSCE suggests that these 
elections were without major violations of European 
electoral standards.
2 The overwhelming victory of 
the Communists (49.48%) is all the more surprising 
                                                      
1 See a list of persons compiled by Chisinau town hall 
who have been arrested and suffered ill treatment, 16 
April 2009 (retrieved from http://www.chisinau.md/news/ 
?nid=59a800d13f6f8167b80df94c6a3c6e4c).  
2 See the “Statement on preliminary findings and 
conclusions” by the International Election Observation 
Mission during the parliamentary elections in Moldova 
on 5 April 2009 (retrieved from http://www.osce.org/ 
odihr/item_12_36406.html).  
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given that they lost the 2007 local elections to the 
opposition and public support had been on the wane 
after the party’s eight years in power. The three 
main opposition parties that made it into parliament 
have requested a verification of the electoral lists, 
which are thought to contain many names of 
ineligible, deceased or expatriated voters. 
Nevertheless, the president only agreed to a recount 
of the votes. The recount was validated by 
Moldova’s Constitutional Court on 22 April 2009, 
but it does not change the election outcome. In the 
meantime, the opposition parties continue to record 
cases of electoral fraud on electoral lists. A 
reassessment of the election results and post-
electoral violence, under the supervision of the 
OSCE and the EU, is therefore a necessary and 
urgent matter.  
Most importantly, the 2009 elections have disrupted 
a tradition of peaceful and regular transfers of power 
from the government to the opposition in 
competitive elections, which Moldova has enjoyed 
since independence. The same trend has been 
present in other Central and Eastern European 
states, now EU members, and it has turned Moldova 
into a good democratic performer in the post-Soviet 
space where elites usually cling on to power 
indefinitely. Moreover, if the Communist Party is 
not strongly condemned for its abuses, it may fall 
into the hands of hard-liners, who have been arguing 
in favour of a Belarus scenario and an outright ban 
of the opposition from public politics. Even if such a 
scenario is unlikely, the disruption of legitimate 
channels of communication between the 
government and opposition and the gradual 
elimination of an independent media and judiciary 
already taking place will lead Moldova onto a path 
of authoritarianism. This is a second possible 
scenario and it will likely follow the pattern of 
Ukraine in the later years of former President 
Leonid Kuchma: building up a police state, pushing 
the opposition onto the streets and strengthening ties 
with similar authoritarian regimes.  
A third scenario would imply salvaging Moldova’s 
shattered, pluralist political system and would 
require stronger EU involvement in solving the 
political crisis. As Moldovan society remains deeply 
divided and conflict-prone, for the sake of stability 
the Communist authorities need to reach out to other 
groups in Moldovan society and engage in political 
dialogue with the opposition, which in the event of 
EU pressure may be favoured by moderate 
Communists. The EU can play a crucial mediating 
role here. Growing proof of large-scale election 
fraud may be used by the EU to mediate a power-
sharing arrangement between the Communists and 
the opposition. It is possible to envisage the 
formation of an interim government including the 
Communist and opposition parties, which would be 
in charge (for no longer than a year) of running 
current government affairs and preparing for new 
elections. The EU could promise financial 
assistance for the new elections and a massive 
election-observation presence. The EU could be a 
persuasive mediator by using the carrots and sticks 
at its disposal. Opening negotiations on a new 
Association Agreement may be such a carrot. The 
EU could also use negative consequences, for 
instance the threat of withholding ENPI funding or 
suspending agreements such as those on visa 
facilitation and the ATP regime. The aim should be 
to convince the main political contenders that only a 
legitimate government could bring the much-needed 
political stability and prosperity to Moldova.  
Good neighbour, bad neighbour? 
Furthermore, by directly accusing neighbouring 
Romania of attempting nothing less than a coup 
d’état, Moldova risks unnecessarily complicating its 
relations with the EU. During the protests, Moldova 
reintroduced a visa regime with Romania and 
expelled dozens of Romanian citizens (including 
most journalists) along with the Romanian 
ambassador. Initially, Romania strongly condemned 
these steps, but stated that it would not retaliate and 
that it would continue to support Moldova’s 
European integration efforts.
3 It is indeed imperative 
for Moldova that Romania is not alienated and that 
it remains a genuine ‘advocate’ of Moldova’s EU 
integration efforts. Romania has substantial 
expertise on Moldova for the EU to draw upon and 
can assist Moldova’s EU integration efforts in a 
variety of ways.  
Still, Romanian President Traian Basescu poured 
fuel on the fire on 14 April when he announced the 
speeding-up of the process of granting Romanian 
citizenship to Moldovans so that it will take a 
maximum of five months. One day later the Law on 
Romanian citizenship was simplified,
4 which 
applies to Moldovan applicants whose (great-
)grandparents were dispossessed of their Romanian 
citizenship under the former Soviet Union (currently 
over 800,000 Moldovans have applied). Such a 
hasty move comes at a bad time and seems ill 
considered for a number of reasons. First, it 
provides further arguments to the Communist 
                                                      
3 See the press statement of the Romanian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs regarding the decisions of the authorities 
in Chişinău on 8 April 2009 (retrieved from 
http://www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=doc&id=13290&idln
k=2&cat=4).  
4 The law was modified by a government emergency 
decree on 15 April 2009, but it still needs the approval of 
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authorities and other states seeking to blame 
Romania for undermining Moldova’s statehood and 
sovereignty. Second, Romania actually may not 
have the administrative capacity to process such a 
huge number of applications in under five months 
and many Moldovans may become disillusioned. 
Third, Basescu’s response may also be viewed as a 
pre-electoral manoeuvre ahead of Romania’s 
presidential elections later this year. The Romanian 
president has been advocating such a measure ever 
since coming to power four years ago, but until 
April had not taken steps to implement it. Why do 
so now, in the midst of a diplomatic crisis with 
Moldova, when all eyes are fixed on the region? 
Finally, the EU is also frowning upon the move, 
dreading the appearance of a million or so EU 
citizens in an undemocratic state with a separatist 
conflict on its territory, on the EU’s eastern border. 
The implications would be huge for the EU’s 
enlargement policy, the ENP, the resolution of the 
Transnistrian conflict and for EU relations with 
Russia. Most EU member states are also fearful of 
another wave of migrant workers, this time EU 
citizens. Hence, there is a chance that Romania’s tit-
for-tat measure may amount to nothing more than a 
bluff. 
‘Eastern neighbourhood’ in the balance 
Apart from having severe consequences for 
Moldova’s future, the present situation also has 
serious implications for the EU’s ENP and EaP. As 
the EaP is being put into place, all Eastern 
neighbours are experiencing setbacks in their 
democratic transitions and in the worst cases they 
are being taken over by creeping authoritarianism. 
Ukraine’s domestic reforms have stalled because of 
political infighting between the president and the 
prime minister; Georgian President Mikhail 
Saakashvili has used repression to silence the 
opposition and media; the ruler of Azerbaijan, Ilham 
Aliev, won a referendum that enables him to stay in 
power for a lifetime; and the election of Serzh 
Sargsyan as the president of Armenia was followed 
by demonstrations, which led to the deaths of 10 
persons at the hands of the police. None of these 
leaders has experienced any negative consequences 
on the part of the EU for their undemocratic 
behaviour. To add to the confusion, Belarus has 
received an invitation to the EaP, despite making 
only token improvements to its authoritarian record. 
The EU’s ambivalence may have sent the wrong 
signals to Moldova’s president, who is hoping to get 
away with repression and abuses. Should the EU fail 
to act, the credibility of the ENP and EaP as soft 
power tools for integrating the EU’s Eastern 
neighbourhood will be at stake if yet another 
Eastern neighbour slips further away from the EU’s 
declared values on democracy and human rights. 
On the one hand, the EU is apprehensive about 
criticising some of these states, being aware that it 
may push them further away and into Russia’s arms. 
But some states, like Azerbaijan and Armenia, may 
simply drift towards Russia owing to the 
attractiveness of the Russian-style ‘sovereign 
democracy’ and ‘illiberal capitalism’. Georgia is 
already using the Russian threat as a pretext to build 
a strong (authoritarian) state, thereby moving in the 
same direction as Azerbaijan and Armenia but under 
pro-Western slogans. Hence, there is no point in 
fearing a pro-Russian backlash, since positive EU 
measures would not necessarily prevent Moldova’s 
rapprochement with Russia. Similarly, as the 
Georgian case proves, a pro-Western orientation is 
not a guarantee that democracy will prevail. Thus, 
the Eastern neighbours tend to sustain their 
authoritarian regimes by choosing to cooperate with 
either the EU or Russia at convenience. This leads 
to another point: the EU should take the 
developments in its Eastern neighbourhood at face 
value and act more in accordance with its own 
norms and values. The EaP should be adapted so 
that it is possible to reward and sanction these states 
with greater flexibility. 
On the other hand, the EU has often found itself 
incapacitated by the concerns of member states that 
EU activism in its Eastern neighbourhood would be 
opposed by Russia, which considers the post-Soviet 
states to be an area of its ‘special interest’. Indeed, 
the Russian reaction to the Moldovan post-electoral 
violence has been swift and straightforward. On 8 
April, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Duma sustained that the Moldovan elections were 
“in full correspondence with democratic and legal 
norms”. Moreover, they accused some unidentified 
internal and external actors of purposefully 
undermining the “socio-economic stability” and 
“balanced foreign policy” in Moldova, as well as its 
“independence and sovereignty”.
5 Nevertheless, 
there are grounds to believe that the EU’s more 
active support of democracy in Moldova would not 
come with the same complications as it does for 
instance in Ukraine (where Russian interests are 
huge), in Georgia (a US ally with strategic 
importance for Russia), in Azerbaijan (where oil 
resources are courted by Russia) or even Armenia 
                                                      
5 See the statement “On the events in Moldova” by the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April 2009 
(retrieved from http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/ 
9B0F3ACDA3E8B52CC3257592002C3EB8); see also 
the statement “On the events in the Republic of Moldova” 
by the Russian Duma, 8 April 2009 (retrieved from 
http://www.duma.gov.ru/). 4 | Dura & Gnedina 
(whose allegiance lies with Moscow), not to 
mention Belarus. Moldova does not have a common 
border with Russia, Moldova’s non-alignment with 
military blocks is enshrined in the Moldovan 
constitution, and it has rather limited strategic 
importance for Russia in terms of political, 
economic or military cooperation. Furthermore, 
given Russia’s long-term obstruction of the conflict-
resolution process in Transnistria, the Moldovan 
elites would most probably be among the most 
reluctant Russian ‘clients’.  
Finally, other factors argue in favour of a stronger 
EU involvement in Moldova. First, the strong 
cultural and linguistic links with Romania will 
inevitably keep Moldova deeply connected to the 
EU. Second, many Moldovans work and study in 
the EU and over 70% of Moldovans living in the 
country support European integration. Third, 
Moldova is a very poor country and relies heavily 
on EU assistance and expertise, including that on 
solving the Transnistrian conflict. Fourth, the EU 
has become Moldova’s main trade partner, partly 
owing to the introduction of the system of 
Asymmetric Trade Preferences (ATP) and partly 
owing to Romania joining the EU. The EU is now a 
threefold larger trading partner than Russia. Against 
this background, the EU can easily rely on the use 
of conditionality and socialisation to induce 
democratic reforms in Moldova. Most importantly, 
coming to the rescue of Moldova’s democracy may 
be beneficial not only for Moldova itself, but may 
also contribute to ensuring the success of the 
ENP/EaP, particularly ahead of the EaP’s launch 
scheduled on 7 May 2009.  
Recommendations 
The EU has been very cautious in responding to 
events in Moldova in relation to the tools at its 
disposal and in relation to Moldova’s importance for 
the success of the EU’s neighbourhood policies. In 
the days following the elections, the EU issued 
several statements calling for calm and dialogue and 
sent the EU special representative (EUSR) for 
Moldova to Chisinau on 7 April for talks with the 
authorities and opposition parties. Several weeks 
after the elections, on 22 April 2009 Czech Prime 
Minister Mirek Topolanek (holding the EU 
presidency) went to Moldova and met with 
President Vladimir Voronin and the opposition. 
Topolanek urged the authorities to start a dialogue 
with the opposition and to set up a new investigation 
commission, including the opposition and European 
Commission officials, to look into allegations of 
human rights violations. Still, there has been no 
clear EU condemnation of the human rights 
violations perpetrated by the outgoing government 
nor has there been one on the fraudulent nature of 
the elections. Crucially, the EU has to think of an 
attractive offer for the new government, conditional 
upon a political agreement with the opposition and 
implementation of further democratic reforms. A 
deeper political agreement with the EU, which may 
include the promise to start negotiations on an 
Association Agreement or a visa-free regime, may 
help put the new government back on the reform 
track. Paradoxically, the economic crisis could also 
come in handy here. As Moldova is badly in need of 
financial assistance, it may show itself more 
amenable to EU, IMF or World Bank demands on 
democratisation. Overall, an EU response to 
Moldova’s crisis has to include a set of immediate 
actions, coupled with a set of mid-term policies vis-
à-vis Moldova, as outlined below.  
Immediate actions 
•  Condemn the human rights violations. The 
EU should formally condemn the human rights 
violations and use formal and informal channels 
to apply pressure on Moldova to ensure that the 
new government will strictly adhere to 
democratic principles and human rights. 
•  Send a fact-finding mission. The fact-finding 
mission should 1) establish whether the 
elections were indeed free and fair; and 2) 
document and investigate the cases of arrests, 
physical abuse and other human rights 
violations. If enough evidence on electoral fraud 
is gathered to warrant new elections, the EU 
should provide financial assistance and a large 
election-observation mission. 
•  Actively mediate between the authorities and 
opposition. The EUSR should receive a strong 
mandate to actively mediate between the 
Communists and the main opposition parties in 
order to arrive at a political agreement on 
whether to recognise the elections or to organise 
new elections following a power-sharing deal 
and more generally to cooperate within 
Moldova’s constitutional framework. 
•  Ask for a number of guarantees. These should 
include that all the persons arrested will be 
granted amnesty and released (except where 
cases of violence or vandalism are actually 
proven). All officials found guilty of 
administrative or physical abuse or harassment 
of the opposition media and activists during the 
election campaign should be sanctioned. All 
journalists, whether foreign or local, should be 
allowed to work unhindered. 
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Medium-term actions (after the 
formation of a new government) 
•  Insist on reforms. The EU should urgently 
invite the government to introduce several 
reforms that would improve future elections. In 
particular these should entail lowering the 
electoral threshold from 6 to 3% in line with the 
recommendations of the Venice Commission, 
reforming the Audiovisual Council, making the 
public broadcaster truly independent and 
resuming TV broadcasting of the parliamentary 
debates (interrupted in 2007), and prolonging 
the TV license of the main independent ProTV, 
etc. 
•  Improve Romanian–Moldovan relations. 
Moldova should refrain from launching serious 
accusations against an EU member state without 
offering evidence. Romania should currently 
refrain from actions that further escalate the 
diplomatic row such as granting passports en 
masse to Moldovan citizens. Relations could be 
normalised by agreeing on the terms of a basic 
treaty and a border treaty. The EU should 
condemn Moldova’s introduction of a visa 
regime for Romanian citizens and the arrests 
and expulsions of EU citizens (mostly 
Romanian). 
•  Make use of conditionality. The EU should 
clearly state that the start of negotiations on an 
Association Agreement, free trade agreement or 
visa-free regime are conditional on the new 
government making a satisfactory effort to bring 
its policies in line with European norms and 
mending the consequences of the post-electoral 
breakdown. Negative consequences, such as 
withholding ENPI funds or suspending a 
number of agreements can also be considered 
(i.e. the visa-facilitated regime and the ATP 
system). 
 
 
•  Consider sending an EU rule-of-law mission. 
Such a mission should have a strong mandate to 
help reform the police and the general 
prosecutor’s office and to second EU officials 
across law-enforcement institutions. 
•  Assist with a package to address the 
economic crisis. The European Commission 
might assist the new government to develop a 
proper economic reform programme that would 
include the international financial institutions 
(IMF and World Bank). 
Since coming to power in 2001, the Moldovan 
Communist Party has succeeded in putting into 
place a democracy in name only – a ‘wannabe 
democracy’ where elections serve as a cover for 
perpetuating an authoritarian regime. The 
authorities’ human rights violations in the aftermath 
of the elections seriously put into doubt any future 
commitment to European norms and values. 
Following the failure of the coloured revolutions 
and the recent events in Moldova, the regional 
context increasingly shows that unstable 
authoritarian systems are more often the norm than 
the exception in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, 
despite the existence of the ENP framework and the 
hundreds of millions of euros already disbursed by 
the EU. It is therefore time for the EU to put in 
place a ‘democracy alert’ mechanism that would 
detect signs of authoritarian backsliding and would 
ensure that the EU acts in time to counter such 
tendencies. Indeed, the EU cannot continuously 
bolster its ENP offer to its neighbours without also 
ensuring that the latter share a real and lasting 
commitment to the EU’s values on democracy and 
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